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NEUROSCIENCE, MINDREADING, 
AND THE COURTS: 
THE EXAMPLE OF PAIN 
 
HENRY T. GREELY* 
 
Our brains hold about 100 billion neurons.1 At the synapses where 
neurons connect, the neurons are constantly giving off and picking up 
chemicals called neurotransmitters, which in turn can cause those neurons 
to “fire”—to run cascading ions down the neurons’ “wires” or axons.2 And 
that process creates the Universe we live in.3 
Not quite, literally. I do believe, though I cannot rigorously prove, that 
you exist, the Earth exists, and the Universe exists outside of our own 
brains, but our only interaction with that reality is through our brains and 
the physical events that happen there. Those objective physical events 
create a subjective and non-physical “thing” we call the mind. If you 
remember tomorrow that you read this Article (or this much of the Article), 
it is because this Article (and I) will have made physical changes to your 
brain.  
As we get better at looking at those physical changes in the brain 
through various new technologies, we can begin to correlate those objective 
physical brain states with subjective mental states.4 We can begin to say 
 
Copyright © 2015 by Henry Greely. 
* Henry Greely is the Deane F. and Kate Edelman Johnson Professor of Law and Professor, by 
courtesy, of Genetics at Stanford University, where he directs the Center for Law and the 
Biosciences, and the Stanford Program in Neuroscience and Society. This Article is adapted from 
the author's Stuart Rome Lecture, delivered at the University of Maryland Carey School of Law 
on April 24, 2014. 
 1. Suzana Herculano-Houzel, The Human Brain in Numbers: A Linearly Scaled-Up Primate 
Brain, FRONTIERS HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE (Nov. 9, 2009), 
http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/neuro.09.031.2009/full. 
 2. See HARVEY LODISH ET AL., MOLECULAR CELL BIOLOGY 935 (4th ed. 2000) (explaining 
the process by which a neurotransmitter, which originates at the presynaptic neuron, sends a signal 
when it is sent to the postsynaptic target cell). 
 3. See Robert Lanza, A New Theory of the Universe: Biocentrism Builds on Quantum 
Physics by Putting Life Into the Equation, AM. SCHOLAR (Mar. 1, 2007), 
https://theamericanscholar.org/a-new-theory-of-the-universe/#.VRIZjjTF-Hw. 
 4. See B. ALAN WALLACE, MIND IN THE BALANCE: MEDITATION IN SCIENCE, BUDDHISM, 
AND CHRISTIANITY 23 (2009) (noting the difference between objectively studying the brain and 
understanding the subjective mental state that is occurring simultaneously). 
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“any time you move the big toe on your left foot, these neurons fire,” or 
“every time you see a face, those neurons fire.”5  
Consider, for example, some spectacular work by Professor Jack 
Gallant at the University of California at Berkeley.6 Gallant’s group showed 
thousands of hours of YouTube videos to some volunteers while they were 
in a magnetic resonance imaging (“MRI”) scanner.7 The MRI noted the 
changes at different times in the relative amounts of oxygenated and de-
oxygenated hemoglobin in different parts of the volunteers’ brains, in a 
process called functional magnetic resonance imaging (“fMRI”).8 
Computers analyzed the resulting data and found correlations between what 
the volunteers were seeing at any given time and the patterns of these 
hemodynamic changes.9 Gallant then took different volunteers, put them in 
the MRI scanner, and showed them trailers from movies.10 His team took 
the resulting brain scans and, using the correlations from the original work, 
“re-created” the scenes from the trailers as the volunteers saw them.11 The 
results are far from perfect—but still close to amazing. When, in a trailer, 
an elephant walks across a plain from left to right, the recreation of what the 
viewer sees from the viewer’s brain scan shows something that looks like 
an elephant-shaped haystack walking from left to right across a plain.12 The 
results come from correlating perceived physical states of the brain with 
 
 5. See Ferris Jabr, Know Your Neurons: How to Classify Different Types of Neurons in the 
Brain’s Forest, SCI. AM. (May 16, 2012), 
http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/brainwaves/2012/05/16/know-your-neurons-classifying-the-
many-types-of-cells-in-the-neuron-forest/ (noting that neurons are classified by function because 
neurons that carry sensory information are not the same neurons that carry signals for motor 
function in the body). 
 6. See Yasmin Anwar, Scientists Use Brain Imaging to Reveal the Movies in Our Mind, UC 
BERKELEY NEWS CENTER (Sept. 22, 2011), http://newscenter.berkeley.edu/2011/09/22/brain-
movies (citing the cutting-edge work by Prof. Jack Gallant and his lab, which have successfully 
reconstructed humans’ visual experiences through computer simulation as the participants 
watched Hollywood movie trailers); see also Shinji Nishimoto et al., Reconstructing Visual 
Experiences from Brain Activity Evoked by Natural Movies, GALLANT LAB @ UC BERKELEY 
http://gallantlab.org/publications/nishimoto-et-al-2011.html (last updated June 18, 2014) 
(explaining the use of an fMRI machine to measure brain activity during the experiment, and the 
computational models used to reconstruct what participants saw). 
 7. Anwar, supra note 6. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. See Malcolm Ritter, Mind-Reading Technology Reconstructs Videos from Brain, SYDNEY 
MORNING HERALD (Sept. 23, 2011), http://www.smh.com.au/technology/sci-tech/mindreading-
technology-reconstructs-videos-from-brain-20110923-1ko5s.html (noting that human forms were 
more recognizable in reconstructions, while figures such as elephants did not transition so clearly). 
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subjective mental states.13 It comes from, in some small way, reading 
minds.  
This Article is about mindreading and its applications to the law. We 
are beginning to be able to use neuroimaging and other techniques to read 
minds.14 Most of the attention in the burgeoning field of law and 
neuroscience has focused on issues of free will and criminal responsibility, 
but the most important contribution that neuroscience will make to the law 
will be through neuroscience-based mindreading. And I suspect its first 
important use will be in the area of detecting “pain,” on which this Article 
will focus.15  
This Article makes that argument in four parts. First, it looks at what 
kind of evidence the law currently uses to read minds, and how 
neuroscience-based evidence would and would not be different.16 Second, it 
discusses some of the possible ways the law could use neuroscience-based 
mindreading.17 Third, in its most novel contribution, it analyzes what kind 
of proof the law should demand of the accuracy of such mindreading 
techniques—and what we would have to invest in developing these 
technologies to be confident in their use.18 Finally, it touches on one of the 
deepest problems that might be raised by the use of accurate mindreading 
evidence in the law.19 
 
 13. Anwar, supra note 6. 
 14. See Rob Hoskin, Can a Neuroscientist Read Your Mind?, SCIENCE BRAINWAVES (Apr. 
30, 2012), http://www.sciencebrainwaves.com/uncategorized/can-a-neuroscientist-read-your-
mind/ (highlighting the neural information that occurs even before a decision is made). 
 15. The implications for the legal system of neuroimaging of evidence of pain is the subject 
of a small, but growing literature. See Adam J. Kolber, The Experiential Future of the Law, 60 
EMORY L.J. 585, 651 (2011) (identifying the need for more objective units to describe certain 
experiences, like pain); Adam J. Kolber, Pain Detection and the Privacy of Subjective Experience 
33 AM. J.L. & MED. 433, 453–54 (2007) (noting the need for more privacy for records regarding 
pain); Amanda C. Pustilnik, Imaging Brains, Changing Minds: How Neuroimaging Can 
Transform the Law’s Approach to Pain, 66 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015); Amanda C. 
Pustilnik, Pain as Fact and Heuristic: How Pain Neuroimaging Illuminates Moral Dimensions of 
Law, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 801, 805 (2012) (highlighting that it is a major challenge to assign 
values to brain imaging, just as it is a challenge to do the same for pain when attempting to create 
law).  
 16. See infra Part I. 
 17. See infra Part II. 
 18. See infra Part III. 
 19. See infra Part IV. I have discussed some of these issues about mindreading twice before in 
some depth. See Henry T. Greely, Neuroscience, Mindreading and the Law, in A PRIMER ON 
CRIMINAL LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 120–49 (Stephen J. Morse & Adina L. Roskies eds., 2013); 
Emily R. Murphy & Henry T. Greely, What Will Be the Limits of Neuroscience-Based 
Mindreading in the Law?, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF NEUROETHICS (Judy Illes & Barbara 
Sahakian eds., 2011) (identifying the technical barriers to meaningful mindreading, including the 
likely impossibility of creating a complete model of the human brain). I have also discussed them 
in less detail in several other publications. See Henry T. Greely & Anthony D. Wagner, Reference 
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We are near the edge of neuroscience-based mindreading in the law. 
As two of my former Stanford post-docs said in an article, we currently see 
“through a scanner darkly.”20 We don’t see clearly, but we see a little, and 
the resolution of the scanner, or at least our understanding of what it means, 
is getting better and better.21 As our resolution and understanding of the 
scanners gets better, it will become more important in the law, in some 
ways discussed here and in others still unforeseen.  
 
I.     CURRENT EVIDENCE OF MENTAL STATES 
 
Each one of us, in our day-to-day lives, reads minds constantly. So 
does the legal system. This section discusses the evidence we currently use 
for mindreading—in our everyday lives and in the law—with particular 
reference to how we understand another’s pain. It then examines how these 
current methods are similar to and different from neuroscience-based 
evidence for mindreading. 
 
A.      Mindreading In General 
 
This Article started as a lecture.22 One tries to convey information in 
both a lecture and in an article, but unlike an article, a lecture is more like a 
conversation and full of mindreading. In any lecture, as with any other 
direct human interaction, I read the minds of my audience. I look to see 
 
Guide on Neuroscience, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 747–812 (National 
Academies Press, 3d ed. 2011) (discussing examples of possible uses and limitations of 
neuroscience in the courts); Henry T. Greely, The Social Effects of Advances in Neuroscience: 
Legal Problems; Legal Perspectives, in NEUROETHICS: DEFINING THE ISSUES IN THEORY, 
PRACTICE AND POLICY 245–63 (Judy Illes ed., 2006) (discussing different ways in which 
neuroscience affects our society, such as better prediction of behavior, improved detection of 
mental states, and enhancement of human brain functions); Henry T. Greely & Judy Illes, 
Neuroscience-Based Lie Detection: The Urgent Need for Regulation, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 377, 
413 (2007) (arguing for federal regulation of fMRI-based lie detection); Henry T. Greely, Law 
and the Revolution in Neuroscience: An Early Look at the Field, 42 AKRON L. REV. 687, 707 
(2009) (pointing out that the “revolution” in neuroscience allows for better understanding of 
human brain processes and thus, better interventions in preserving or enhancing brain functions). 
 20. Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy, Through a Scanner Darkly: Functional Neuroimaging 
as Evidence of a Criminal Defendant’s Past Mental States, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1119, 1179–99 
(2009) (discussing the reasons why functional brain imaging should not be admitted as evidence 
of a defendant’s past mental state). Their title, of course, combines the title of the novel by the 
amazing Philip K. Dark, A SCANNER DARKLY (1976), with language from St. Paul’s First Letter 
to the Corinthians, “Now we see through a glass, darkly . . . .” I Corinthians 13:12 (King James). 
 21. See Brown & Murphy, supra note 20, at 1144 (describing how magnetic resonance 
imaging scanners collect, process, and analyze functional imaging data). 
 22. Neuroimaging, Mindreading, and the Courts, The Stuart Rome Lecture, Imaging the 
Brain, Changing Minds: Chronic Pain Neuroimaging and the Law Symposium (Apr. 24, 2014).  
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who is awake, who is asleep, who is texting on their cell phone, who is 
confused, who is angry. I try to do this primarily by looking at faces, though 
also through examining some “body language,” which is usually pretty 
limited when observing seated listeners.  
In two-way verbal communications, either through face-to-face or by 
video-call, we read other people’s minds in part through the content of what 
they say, and also through their facial expressions and tone of voice.23 By 
telephone, we still have tone of voice but lose the facial cues. In e-mail or 
internet postings, we lose the tone of voice, which accounts for the popular 
and important use of emoticons to provide more clues for mindreading—
was that a joke or not? (And, of course, the writer’s problem is the inability 
to read the readers’ minds, caused by the lack of any feedback from the 
readers.) 
What we do in this day-to-day mindreading, of course, does not give 
us any deep or necessarily accurate insight into what the other person is 
truly thinking. We are looking at the outward appearance of that person 
through their physical states—facial configurations, pitch, and accent of 
words, and so on—and correlating that with mental states through our own 
experiences.24 This experience can be with humanity in general, or with 
that particular person—“she is always angry when her nose looks like 
that.”25 We read minds through this correlation between objective physical 
states and subjective mental states.26  
This is likely an ancient and crucial human survival trait, encouraged 
and preserved by evolution. It has been a long time since most humans have 
had to worry more about lions and tigers and bears than about other 
humans. The ability to guess whether the person coming toward you is 
about to share food with you or attack you is and has long been a vital 
survival skill.  
 
 23. See Jing Jiang et al., Neural Synchronization During Face-to-Face Communication, 32 J. 
NEUROSCIENCE 16064, 16064 (2012) (stating that nonverbal cues such as orofacial movements, 
facial expressions, and gestures are used to adapt our responses during communication). 
 24. See, e.g., Peter Carruthers, How We Know Our Minds: The Relationship Between 
Mindreading and Metacognition, 32 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 121, 121–22 (2009) (claiming that 
humans routinely and often unconsciously represent mental states using perceptions of others, 
forming expectations accordingly). 
 25. See Rana el Kaliouby & Peter Robinson, Real-Time Inference of Complex Mental States 
from Facial Expressions and Head Gestures, in REAL-TIME VISION FOR HUMAN-COMPUTER 
INTERACTION 181 (Branislav Kisačanin et al. eds., 2005) (stating that the human face is an 
essential and spontaneous means for communicating mental states). 
 26. Id. (explaining that facial expressions communicate feelings as well as cognitive mental 
states). 
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Some people lack that skill.27 One of the great disabilities for many 
people with autism is that they do not develop what the psychologists call a 
“theory of mind.”28 They do not have feeling for what other people are 
thinking and often, as a result, have trouble getting along with others.29  
Reading minds is very important.30 We learn it from an early age, we 
use it every day, and we take it for granted. But what we are doing is taking 
accessible evidence of external physical states and using it to infer 
subjective mental states that are not directly accessible.31 
We need no accessible evidence of external physical states to know if 
we are in pain. We either feel pain or we do not. Someone else might 
objectively conclude that, under the circumstances, we should not be 
feeling the, say, phantom limb pain. Or that observer might be certain that 
we should be in terrible pain from our own injuries in the car crash from 
which we are desperately trying to remove a loved one. But our pain does 
not need external indicia, at least to convince us. The pain is (or is not) our 
direct perception, proximately created by the firing of some of the neurons 
in our brain.  
How do we decide whether other people are in pain? One way, of 
course, is to ask them, “are you in pain?” In most circumstances, if 
someone is not asleep, not unconscious, or not unable to understand or 
speak a common language with you, asking them is a good start. But it is 
not necessarily the end of the story—sometimes people do not tell the truth. 
As Hamlet said, “one may smile, and smile, and be a villain.”32 
The fact that people do not always tell the truth, or that sometimes they 
exaggerate, is something that we learn, usually to our disadvantage, very 
early in life. If people say they are in pain but we want further confirmation, 
what else can we do? We can, and do, look for external circumstances that 
 
 27. Id. (remarking that majority of people attribute mental states to persons from observed 
behaviors, and those who are not able to are at a disadvantage). 
 28. See Carruthers, supra note 24, at 136 (claiming that almost everyone believes that third-
person mindreading is impaired in autism); Vivek Misra, The Social Brain Network and Autism, 
21 ANNALS NEUROSCIENCE 69, 69 (2014) (discussing the “Theory of Mind” in autism, where 
there is an inability to infer the state of mind of another person); see also el Kaliouby & Robinson, 
supra note 25, at 181 (citing that people diagnosed with autism spectrum disorders lack the ability 
to read minds of others). 
 29. Rachel C. Leung et al., Early Neural Activation During Facial Affect Processing in 
Adolescents with Autism Spectrum Disorder, 7 NEUROIMAGE: CLINICAL 203, 203 (2015), 
available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.nicl.2014.11.009 (stating that individuals with autism 
experience difficulties with social cues and understanding of another person’s mental state, and 
thus have impaired social functioning). 
 30. See el Kaliouby & Robinson, supra note 25, at 181 (stating that mindreading is 
fundamental to social interaction, and it allows people to understand others’ actions). 
 31. Id. 
 32. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK, act 1, sc. 5, ln.108. 
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correlate with pain. Some may be obvious causes of the pain while others 
may be predictable consequences of it.  
For example, imagine someone has just been in a car accident. The 
jagged remnants of his femur are sticking out through the bloody wound in 
his leg as he screams wildly, while hopping frantically down the street to 
get away from the burning and possibly explosive car. That seems the kind 
of circumstantial evidence that would lead many of us to conclude that he is 
in pain. We see a wound that we would expect to cause great pain. We see 
behavior like screaming, wincing, avoiding putting weight on the injured 
leg that is consistent with a painful leg.  
If, months later, you see that person again and he is limping, how do 
you interrogate his pain? You can ask him. You can watch him walk. 
Watching him limp could be consistent with him being in pain, but it could 
also be consistent with a false limp, or it could be consistent with a limp 
from a remaining structural flaw in his leg that is not painful. The limp is 
one piece of external evidence about his pain, but you could also talk to his 
friends. If one says “Pain? No, he never seemed to be in pain; he played 
five sets of singles tennis yesterday,” that is some external evidence 
consistent with an absence of pain, though even that is not conclusive. The 
pain may be intense but intermittent, or pain may be eliminated by 
occasional use of strong drugs or very strong incentives. We use this non-
direct, circumstantial evidence to try to draw conclusions about somebody’s 
mental state with regard to pain.33 
We all use these methods to read minds. We just cannot use them 
perfectly. After all, if we could read minds perfectly, poker would not exist, 
dating would be quite different, and negotiations would be much shorter.  
 
B.     The Law’s Current Efforts at Mindreading 
 
The law tries to read minds all of the time. “Was this premeditated?” 
“Was this done with malice aforethought?” “Was this reckless?” “Was this 
knowing?” “Did you realize that the bonds you were trying to sell were 
 
 33. For any readers who are or have been a parent of a small child, another example may be 
the way you determined whether your toddler was really in pain or was just seeking to manipulate 
other people, such as convincing you to discipline his or her sibling. The sounds, the apparent 
cause of the pain, the child’s reaction to your reaction—all of these can help you assess just how 
real that pain was. See Lesley Budell et al., Mirroring Pain in the Brain: Emotional Expression 
Versus Motor Imitation, PLOS ONE (Feb. 11, 2015), 
www.plosone.org/article/fetchObject.action?uri=info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0107526&represe
ntation=PDF (stating that perception of pain experienced by another person has many channels 
through which the emotion and sensorium of another is communicated). 
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fraudulent?” All of these are questions about people’s internal and 
subjective mental states.  
Sometimes these are questions that the finders of fact can only assess 
by looking witnesses in the eye and trying to decide whether to believe 
them or not. But often, the law has other evidence that it believes correlates 
with relevant mental states. These may be recorded or remembered words 
that parties or witnesses said or wrote. Or it might be various actions that 
they took, like buying one-way tickets to Brazil the day before they got 
arrested. Or it could be various past events in their lives that may help 
establish motives or capabilities. All of these are external and objective 
pieces of evidence that the law uses to probe for witnesses’ internal and 
subjective mental state.  
Pain is one of the subjective mental states that the law most often 
needs to determine. Hundreds of thousands of legal proceedings each year 
in the United States turn on the existence and extent of someone’s (usually 
a plaintiff’s or claimant’s) pain.34 Sometimes those are personal injury 
cases, in which plaintiffs seek damages for their “pain and suffering” for the 
past, present, and predictably future in the aftermath of accidents.35 Most of 
them are actually disability cases, brought under federal or state disability 
schemes, or against private disability insurers.36 Although the technical 
question in those cases is not pain per se, it is quite often a question as to 
whether the claimants’ pains are so great as to prevent them from 
working.37 
The law will, when it can, ask the plaintiff or claimant whether or not 
he or she is in pain, but, with often substantial money at stake, the other 
side (the defendant, the disability program, or insurer) is not going to be 
 
 34. Pustilnik, supra note 15, at 802 (stating that pain is omnipresent in the law, and the 
presence and degree of physical pain are defined by various legal domains). 
 35. See Jack H. Olender, Proof and Evaluation of Pain and Suffering in Personal Injury 
Litigation, 11 DUKE L.J. 344, 344 (1962) (stating how past, present, and future pain and suffering 
are well recognized elements of damages in personal injury actions). 
 36. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Civil Cases, OFF. JUST. PROGRAMS,  
http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=45 (last visited Mar. 29, 2015) (stating that a large 
number of personal injury claims stem from medical malpractice and automobile accidents, and 
are brought in state or federal courts); see also THE FUTURE OF DISABILITY IN AMERICA 33, 437 
(Marilyn J. Field & Alan M. Jette eds., 2007) (listing the different laws and avenues where people 
can bring disability suits). 
 37. Under Social Security Disability Insurance, the first question is whether you can resume 
the work you did before you became disabled. If the answer is “no,” the next question is whether 
you can adjust to doing other work. See SOCIAL SECURITY, DISABILITY BENEFITS 9–10 (2014), 
available at http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-10029.pdf (stating that the Social Security 
Administration asks several questions about a potential receiver’s ability to work and how it is 
affected). 
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satisfied with only self-report.38 Neither will the legal system.39 Instead, the 
legal system will look for some external evidence to corroborate the claim 
of pain.40 Just as we do in our day-to-day lives, the law will look for 
evidence about a plausible cause for the pain, as well as evidence from 
others about whether the plaintiff’s or claimant’s behavior has been 
consistent with that claimed pain.41  
Sometimes, though, the law will also seek expert testimony.42 A 
physician may be called to discuss the results of various kinds of imaging.43 
She may testify that the MRI of the person’s back shows bulging 
intervertebral disks, which is consistent with the chronic lower back pain 
the person reports. Or the physician may state that her patient’s PET scan 
shows that the patient’s tumor has metastasized to the bones, and that 
severe pain is quite common in this circumstance. Or the expert testimony 
may not involve imaging at all. An expert witness might be called to testify 
how common it is for people who, for example, have had a hand amputated 
to feel continuing pain years after the amputation.44 
For better or for worse, physicians are limited to providing evidence of 
objective, externally accessible facts (the bulging disks or the bone 
metastases) and their correlation (positive, negative, or neither) with the 
claimed pain.45 They have no “pain meter” and no device that can directly 
 
 38. See id. at 7–8 (stating that in order to find benefits under social security, the applicant 
must provide all information and proof of disability, including substantial evidence such as 
medical records, names and dosages of medicine, and laboratory test results to support a potential 
applicant’s claim). 
 39. Olender, supra note 35, at 367 (stating that it is advantageous to have medical experts 
support a plaintiff’s claim). 
 40. Id. 
 41. See id. (stating that expert testimony is admissible and essential to recovery for damages 
where facts may not infer pain and suffering). 
 42. Id. 
 43. See AM. ACAD. OF NEUROLOGY, QUALIFICATIONS AND GUIDELINES FOR THE EXPERT 
WITNESS (June 25, 2005), available at 
https://www.aan.com/uploadedFiles/Website_Library_Assets/Documents/8.Membership/5.Ethics/
1.Code_of_Conduct/Membership-Ethics-
American%20Academy%20of%20Neurology%20Qualifications%20and%20Guidelines%20for%
20the%20Physician%20Expert%20Witness%20%282%29.pdf (stating the elements of medical 
expert testimony for neurologists, including discussing imaging). 
 44. See Olender, supra note 35, at 359–60, 367 (explaining the concept behind “phantom 
pain,” where amputees feel pain where the amputated part used to be, and that it may be explained 
through expert testimony in order to be compensated in personal injury actions); Vilayanar S. 
Ramachandran & Diane Rogers-Ramachandran, Phantom Limbs and Neural Plasticity, 57 
NEUROLOGICAL REV. 317, 317 (2000) (explaining the phenomenon of a “phantom limb,” where 
people may still feel pain despite amputation), 
 45. See Olender, supra note 35, at 366 (stating that most clinical work is not germane to 
proving the pain in an individual, and that physicians are limited in accurately measuring pain); 
see also Tonya Eippert, A Proposal to Recognize a Legal Obligation on Physicians to Provide 
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measure a person’s level of pain. And that is often perceived as the promise, 
in the context of pain, of neuroimaging: that it might provide evidence, not 
of conditions that correlate with pain, but of pain itself. But that is wrong. 
 
 
C.      Neuroimaging Compared with Current Methods of Mindreading 
 
 How would the potential use of neuroimaging for mindreading 
compare to our more accustomed methods of mindreading? Very closely.  
Neuroimaging, at least as it currently seems plausible, cannot provide 
direct evidence of the subjective mental state itself.46 Instead, in its most 
discussed form (fMRI), neuroimaging provides direct evidence of the ratio 
of oxygenated to de-oxygenated hemoglobin in small cubic volumes of the 
brain (known as voxels), and of the changes in those ratios over time.47 
Those changes are then used to infer activity in particular brain structures, 
in a particular order, and, perhaps, in relative intensities.48 Those activation 
patterns are then correlated with activation patterns of many people’s brains 
when they reported (honestly, it is believed) their own subjective mental 
states of experiencing pain, of knowingly telling a lie, of feeling a particular 
emotion, or of recognizing an image as something they had seen before.49  
As an example in the case of pain, the researchers will inflict upon the 
subjects some acute (but not damaging) pain.50 Parts of their arms may 
have been smeared with capsaicin, the most active ingredient in chili 
 
Adequate Medication to Alleviate Pain, 12 J.L & HEALTH 384–85 (1998) (stating the Texas 
Second District Court of Appeal’s examples of objective evidence of injury that would support an 
award for pain and suffering, including skull and facial fractures and other various injuries).  
 46. See Russell A. Poldrack, Inferring Mental States from Neuroimaging Data: From Reverse 
Inference to Large-Scale Decoding, 72 NEURON PERSPECTIVE 692, 695 (2011) (stating that 
decoding methods cannot overcome neuroimaging’s inherently correlational nature). 
 47. See Tor D. Wager et al., Elements of Functional Neuroimaging, in HANDBOOK OF 
PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 19, 21 (John T. Cacioppo et al. eds., 3d ed. 2007) (stating that fMRI uses the 
Blood Oxygen Level Dependent (“BOLD”) method to measure the ratio of oxygenated to 
deoxygenated hemoglobin in the blood across regions of the brain).  
 48. Id. at 34 (stating that the inferential context for neuroimaging studies show the various 
regions that are activated).  
 49. Natalie Salmanowitz, The Case for Pain Neuroimaging in the Courtroom: Lessons from 
Deception Detection, 2 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 139, 143–44 (2015).  
 50. Id. at 145 (explaining how infliction of pain assists in pain neuroimaging studies); see 
also Martin S. Angst et al., Determining Heat and Mechanical Pain Threshold in Inflamed Skin of 
Human Subjects, J. VISUALIZED EXPERIMENTS (Jan. 14, 2009), at 1–2, 
http://www.jove.com/pdf/1092/jove-protocol-1092-determining-heat-mechanical-pain-threshold-
inflamed-skin-human (explaining the method of testing pain, which involved applying a heated 
metal plate to participants’ skin and asking participants when they began to experience pain). 
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peppers, or touched with a heated metal rod.51 They are asked to indicate 
whether they feel pain.52 The MRI machine measures the hemoglobin ratios 
before and a few seconds after the stimulus, and its results are then 
analyzed through various complex statistical methods (notably those 
involving machine learning algorithms) to find patterns of activation that 
correlate with pain or its absence.53 Similar experiments are involved in 
other mindreading fMRI approaches.54  
Structural (as opposed to functional) MRI provides another possible 
method of mindreading. In this case, the actual size, shape, and density of 
various brain structures are measured.55 Those measurements in an 
individual case could be correlated with the size and shape of those 
structures in other people who are known to have had a particular condition, 
such as Alzheimer disease or schizophrenia or pain.56 Again, to use pain as 
an example, certain brain regions often are smaller than normal in people 
who have lived with chronic pain compared with other, very similar people 
who have not had chronic pain (the control group).57 
 
 51. See Christian Geber et al., Numbness in Clinical and Experimental Pain – A Cross-
Sectional Study Exploring the Mechanisms of Reduced Tactile Function, 139 PAIN 73, 74 (2008) 
(stating how in certain pain experiments, capsaicin was applied to the right or left forearm in 
subjects); see also Angst et al., supra note 50. 
 52. See Angst et al., supra note 50, at 1 (stating that after applying the rod, study participants 
are asked when they begin to feel pain). 
 53. See What Makes MRI Sensitive to Brain Activity?, NUFFIELD DEP’T CLINICAL 
NEUROSCIENCES, http://www.ndcn.ox.ac.uk/research/introduction-to-fmri/what-is-fmri/what-
does-fmri-measure-cont;d=Rk1SSUI= (last visited Feb. 27, 2015) (detailing the process of blood 
oxygenation level dependent (“BOLD”) MRI which depends on hemoglobin ratios to detect small 
changes in brain activity to determine reactions to stimuli); see also Richard H. Gracely et al., 
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Evidence of Augmented Pain Processing in 
Fibromyalgia, 46 ARTHRITIS & RHEUMATISM 1333, 1334 (2002) (noting that different types of 
brain scans now have a well-established history of being a useful tool for detecting if the 
individual is feeling pain). 
 54. See Gracely et al., supra note 53, at 1340 (showing fMRI results from a study of patients 
with fibromyalgia to determine how they processed pain differently from those without the 
disease). 
 55. See Carolyn Asbury, Brain Imaging Technologies and Their Applications in 
Neuroscience, DANA FOUND. (Nov. 2011), at 10, 12, 
https://www.dana.org/uploadedFiles/Pdfs/brainimagingtechnologies.pdf (describing the difference 
between a traditional MRI, which creates an image of the brain, and a fMRI, which “shows the 
brain in action”). 
 56. See Martha E. Shenton et al., A Review of MRI Findings in Schizophrenia, 49 
SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 1, 6 (2001) (reviewing over a decade of research that used MRI technology 
to study the physical differences in brain structures between patients with and without 
schizophrenia). 
 57. A. Vania Apkarian et al., Chronic Back Pain is Associated with Decreased Prefrontal and 
Thalamic Gray Matter Density, 17 J. NEUROSCIENCE 10410, 10413 (2004) (discussing an early 
study that found that chronic pain sufferers had decreased gray matter compared to control 
subjects without chronic pain). 
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Various other methods, including electroencephalograms, CT 
(computerized tomography) scans, diffusion tensor imaging, and 
electrocorticography could also be used.58 In every case, they would 
measure some objective physical (including electrical) state relevant to 
brain activity that would then be correlated with similar physical states in 
other people (or perhaps in the same person at other times) known, almost 
entirely by self-report, to be correlated with certain subjective mental 
states.59  
This is not fundamentally different from how we and the law go about 
assessing someone else’s pain. We look at objective, physical evidence—
the sounds people make (whether words, groans, or screams), their 
behavior, and the past or present physical condition of parts of their bodies 
other than their brains (including sometimes imaging of those body parts)—
that we believe are correlated with given mental states. Sometimes we get 
expert testimony about those correlations; other times we just use our own, 
often flawed, experience.  
Neuroimaging evidence of mental states will usually, if not always, be 
like current evidence in another, important way: it will be used as one of 
several different lines of evidence. One of the areas where the discussion of 
neuroimaging-based mindreading often takes a wrong turn (which I have 
been guilty of myself) is by assuming the neuroimaging result is the 
definitive signal—something that, all by itself, conclusively demonstrates 
the existence or absence of the mental state in question.  
That might, perhaps, occasionally be true, but it is much more likely 
that the neuroimaging will be one additional piece of independent evidence. 
 
 58. See Asbury, supra note 55, at 13–16 (defining the technical process of other 
neuroimaging techniques, such as electroencephalograms and diffusion tensor imaging, and their 
common uses in comparison to different types of MRIs); see also M. Demitri, Types of Brain 
Imaging Techniques, PSYCH CENTRAL, http://psychcentral.com/lib/types-of-brain-imaging-
techniques/0001057 (last visited Mar. 14, 2015) (describing how CT scans work to show the 
“gross features” of the brain). 
 59. See John-Dylan Haynes & Gearing Rees, Decoding Mental States From Brain Activity in 
Humans, 7 NATURE REVS. 523, 530 (2006) (cautioning that while neuroimaging is advancing to 
the point that brain activity could be mapped and, in some cases, attributed to certain mental 
states, it is currently difficult to generalize that information because such comparisons between 
people are not yet reliable). The polygraph is an interesting example of how a scientific test could 
be used to demonstrate a mental state in court. It measures a variety of physical states, including 
pulse rate, breathing rate, blood pressure, and galvanic skin response (sweaty palms), all of which 
are correlated with the emotion of nervousness. See Greely & Illes, supra note 19, at 386 
(detailing the physical conditions that a polygraph machine can measure). Polygraphs are not 
generally admissible in court because those correlations are not considered strong enough. But 
they are in admitted in court in some instances, and are used more broadly in administrative 
proceedings or other law-related contexts. Id.; see generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE 
POLYGRAPH AND LIE DETECTION (2003) (discussing the scientific evidence of the polygraph). 
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Brains are complicated and individual.60 It is unlikely that everyone’s brain 
will react the same way to exactly the same stimulus, particularly with a 
complex stimulus or behavior.61 It is more likely that, at best, an expert 
testifying about the implications of an fMRI scan with respect to the 
subject’s subjective feeling of pain will be able to say something like “when 
we see this pattern of brain activation, in similar circumstances, 90 percent 
of people we believe to be honest report that they’re in pain. When we take 
people who report, we think honestly, that they are not in pain, we only see 
this pattern five percent of the time.” 
That evidence would then be considered along with plaintiffs’ or 
claimants’ self-reports, other reports of their behavior, evidence about the 
presence or absence of some physical condition correlated with the 
existence of pain, and so on. Neuroimaging may well be strong evidence, 
but it is very unlikely to be perfect.62 If we saw a person whose leg had just 
been broken, screaming in apparent agony and avoiding any pressure on 
that leg, we would likely (and rightly) dismiss a simultaneous fMRI study 
(assuming that were possible) that showed a very low likelihood of pain. In 
neuroimaging, as in our day-to-day world, we may read minds, but not 
perfectly. It will, at least some times, be one added piece of evidence that 
the triers of fact should consider in reaching a decision.  
Forensic DNA, the great breakthrough in scientific evidence in the last 
several decades, provides a somewhat unfortunate parallel for forensic 
mindreading. Forensic DNA, the use of a person’s DNA variations to 
identify him as the same or different person from the person who left a 
DNA sample, is much closer to perfect than mindreading is or is likely ever 
to be.63 The chances of a match between any two random people are, 
 
 60. See Douglas B. McKeag & Jeffrey S. Kutcher, Concussion Consensus: Raising the Bar 
and Filling in the Gaps, 19 CLINICAL J. SPORT MED. 343, 344–45 (2009) (noting that the 
variability of each brain poses a challenge to clinical decision making). 
 61. Id. at 343–45 (noting that even if you had 100 similar athletes sustain identical traumas to 
the head, the outcomes for each would be different because of individual variations in the brain). 
 62. See Adam Teitcher, Note, Weaving Functional Brain Imaging Into the Tapestry of 
Evidence: A Case for Functional Neuroimaging in Federal Criminal Courts, 80 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 355, 393–94 (2011) (noting that if neuroimaging were to be used, in this case, as evidence in 
a criminal trial, it would not be used in isolation to draw definitive conclusions, but it would still 
be considered in the context of other types of evidence). 
 63. See DNA Fingerprinting, GENEED, 
http://geneed.nlm.nih.gov/topic_subtopic.php?tid=37&sid=38 (last visited Mar. 29, 2015) 
(explaining how DNA fingerprinting—that is, DNA used in a forensic or criminal case context—
is when DNA evidence is taken from a crime scene and compared to a sample from a suspect); see 
also How Accurate is Forensic Analysis?, WASH. POST (April 16, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/local/forensic-analysis-methods/ (observing that 
DNA is the only method of forensic analysis that is consistent and accurate, though if lab 
technicians do not handle the DNA evidence properly, the accuracy could be compromised). 
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although not (quite) zero, infinitesimal.64 Forensic laboratories could 
always make those odds even lower by examining more than the tiny 
fraction of DNA currently pressed into normal forensic use.65  
But even forensic DNA is not, and cannot be, perfect.66 Some people 
have twins, and forensic DNA, at least as it is usually employed today, 
cannot distinguish between identical twins, though it can easily distinguish 
non-identical ones.67 Some DNA samples will be degraded or so 
intermingled as to lead to possible errors.68 Some samples will be 
mislabeled or misread through accident or through fraud.69  
The rest of genetics, that is, genetics that looks for associations 
between genetic variations and diseases or traits (and not identification of 
genetic variations and diseases or traits), provides a useful parallel. Some 
doctors and scientists used to think that genes were destiny—that a 
particular genetic variant led inevitably to a particular result.70 The more we 
have learned about genetics, the less true that view has become.71 In 
 
 64. See William C. Thompson et al., How the Probability of a False Positive Affects the Value 
of DNA Evidence, 48 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1, 1 (2003) (citing to a an example of a jury being told that 
a random match, though unlikely, could occur). 
 65. See William C. Thompson, The Potential for Error in Forensic DNA Testing (an Extract 
from the Full Paper), GENEWATCH, Nov.–Dec. 2008, at 5, 8 (noting that as the number of alleles 
in a DNA profile decrease, meaning that a smaller sample is compared, the probability that a 
random person would be a match for that sample increases, which suggests that the converse is 
also true). 
 66. See id. at 5–6 (describing how DNA matches are generally very reliable, but it cannot be 
guaranteed to be accurate in every situation). 
 67. Traditional forensic DNA could not distinguish between identical twins, but next 
generation sequencing technology will likely resolve this problem. See Jacqueline Weber-
Lehmann et. al., Finding the Needle in the Haystack: Differentiating “Identical” Twins in 
Paternity Testing and Forensics by Ultra-Deep Next Generation Sequencing, 9 FORENSIC SCI. 
INT'L: GENETICS 42, 45 (2014) (describing new testing methods that would be able to distinguish 
identical twins because of very small genetic variations found in body fluid samples); see also 
Nadia Drake, A Test That Distinguishes Identical Twins May Be Used in Court for First Time, 
WIRED (Dec. 4, 2014) http://www.wired.com/2014/12/genetic-test-distinguishes-identical-twins-
may-used-court-first-time/ (describing how this new technique could be used in the legal arena 
this year to solve a rape case where DNA evidence taken from semen will indicate that one man 
committed the crime—not his twin brother). 
 68. See Thompson, supra note 65, at 6 (describing how degradation or contamination can 
interfere with accurate matching in DNA samples). 
 69. Id. And, of course, even a correct DNA identification only says the sample came from the 
suspect or defendant, not that he was guilty of the crime. The DNA may have gotten to the crime 
scene innocently. See id. (discussing potential errors in the laboratory setting and the possibility 
that someone could intentionally manipulate the biological evidence). 
 70. See I. de Melo-Martín, Firing up the Nature/Nurture Controversy: Bioethics and Genetic 
Determinism, 31 J. MED. ETHICS 526, 526 (2005) (stating that discussions of genetic determinism 
have been around for a long time). 
 71. See Margaret Lock, Eclipse of the Gene and the Return of Divination, 46 CURRENT 
ANTHROPOLOGY (SUPP.) S46, S50 (2005) (explaining that genes determine very little). 
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defense of those who supported this theory, the first associations between 
particular genetic variations and diseases were always very strong. The 
strongest associations were the easiest to find and hence the first to be 
found, leading to ascertainment bias. It was not irrational to think that other, 
still undiscovered single genetic variations would also be fully responsible 
for diseases. Instead, for most diseases (including some, like cystic fibrosis, 
which used to be thought as “fully penetrant,” affecting everyone with the 
relevant genetic variation), we now know that variations in DNA are almost 
always just one influence, increasing or decreasing the person’s risk from 
that of the average person, along with the effects of environment and 
chance.72 Genetic variations are thumbs on the probability scale, moving 
people from, for example, a 15 percent lifetime risk of a disease up to a 25 
percent risk, or down to a five percent risk.  
There are still some variations in the genome that are all powerful. As 
far as we know, the only way a person with the genetic variations that cause 
Huntington’s disease will not die from that disease is to die first from 
something else.73 There may be a few cases where neuroimaging evidence 
will be similarly powerful. It seems likely, for example, that an adult74 
whose visual cortex is shown (by neuroimaging) to have been completely 
destroyed by a tumor, a stroke, or an accident will be totally blind.75 
Without a visual cortex, even someone with perfectly functioning eyes and 
nerves will not be able see.76  
 
 72. See Steven P. Spielberg, Editor-in-Chief’s Commentary: Gene Penetrance, Therapeutic 
Targets, and Regulatory Science, 47 THERAPEUTIC INNOVATION & REG. SCI. 289, 289 (2013) 
(explaining that cystic fibrosis is now understood to be caused by a variety of mutations); see also 
Lock, supra note 71, at S50 (characterizing genes as one actor in a complex scenario). 
 73. See Marianne J U Novak & Sarah J Tabrizi, Huntington’s Disease, 341 BRIT. MED. J. 34, 
37 (2010) (labeling Huntington’s as a slowly progressing incurable disease). 
 74. Brains are complicated, and sometimes damage to seemingly essential areas can be 
compensated for if it happens early in life. For example, some children who are missing half of 
their cerebrums—the biggest and most “human” part of the brain—can grow up to be normal or 
very close to it. See Charles Choi, Strange but True: When Half a Brain Is Better than a Whole 
One, SCI. AM. (May 24, 2007), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/strange-but-true-when-
half-brain-better-than-whole (explaining the operation of hemispherectomy and how children 
receiving the operation develop with normal memory and personality). 
 75. See Marco Tamietto et al., Unseen Facial and Bodily Expressions Trigger Fast Emotional 
Reactions, 42 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 17661, 17661 (2009) (referring to the phenomenal 
blindness that results from unilateral destruction of the visual cortex). But see Petra Stoerig, 
Blindsight, Conscious Vision, and the Role of the Visual Cortex, 155 PROGRESS BRAIN RES. 217, 
230 (2006) (noting that the brain’s plastic capacities allow functional improvements following the 
destruction of the primary visual cortex). 
 76. See How Vision Works, BRAIN HQ, http://www.brainhq.com/brain-resources/brain-facts-
myths/how-vision-works (last visited Mar. 8, 2015) (explaining how the visual cortex is necessary 
for the perception of size, depth, edges, color, and form). 
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For mindreading, understanding a specific individual’s subjective 
mental states means that it seems likely that most, if not all, of the 
neuroimaging evidence will be suggestive (or non-informative), but not 
conclusive. But it will still provide some evidence. How good that evidence 
will be and how we will want to use it are the questions to which we now 
turn.  
 
II.      HOW MIGHT THE LAW USE NEUROSCIENCE-BASED MINDREADING 
EVIDENCE? 
 
Assuming the evidence were sufficiently accurate, an issue discussed 
in Part III, the possibilities for using neuroscience-based mindreading 
evidence in the law are limited only by the relevance of mental states to the 
law, which is to say, almost unlimited. This section will briefly set out three 
potential uses: communication, lie detection understood broadly, and lie 
detection understood narrowly. 
 
A.      Communication 
 
Neuroimaging-based mindreading might allow communication with 
people with whom one cannot otherwise communicate. An amazing 
example of this comes from recent research in people who have “disorders 
of consciousness.”77  
These people have consciousness that is limited in one way or 
another.78 Some are in comas, which is a relatively transitory state akin to 
 
 77. See generally Joseph T. Fins, Rethinking Disorders of Consciousness: New Research and 
Its Implications, 35 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 22, 22 (2005) (explaining how new understandings 
of brain injury are shaping how the potential for recovery is approached); Disorders of 
Consciousness, DRUGS.COM, http://www.drugs.com/cg/disorders-of-consciousness.html (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2015) (explaining disorders of consciousness as conditions where the state of 
awareness or wakefulness is disturbed); see also Matthew H. Davis et al., Dissociating Speech 
Perception and Comprehension at Reduced Levels of Awareness, 41 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 
U.S. 16032 (2007) (finding high levels of resilience for speech during sedation); J. Andrew 
Billings et al., Severe Brain Injury and the Subjective Life, 40 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 17, 17 
(2010) (referring to the novel idea that communication with patients may be possible following a 
severe brain injury); D.J. Wilkinson et al., Functional Neuroimaging and Withdrawal of Life-
Sustaining Treatment from Vegetative Patients, 35 J. MED. ETHICS 508 (2009) (outlining the 
ethical issues associated with removal of life support in the context of new brain-imaging 
research). 
 78. See Olivia Gosseries et al., Disorders of Consciousness: Coma, Vegetative and Minimally 
Conscious States, in STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS: EXPERIMENTAL INSIGHTS INTO MEDITATION, 
WAKING, SLEEP AND DREAMS 29, 30–31 (Dean Cvetkovic & Irena Cosic eds., 2011) (explaining 
that when the interaction of the cerebral cortex, brainstem, and thalamus is disrupted, 
consciousness becomes impaired). 
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deep sleep.79 People in comas do not respond to stimuli; they tend either to 
die or improve within a few weeks.80 Other people are in what is called a 
“vegetative state.”81 These people are also unresponsive to stimuli, but they 
do not always seem to be asleep.82 They go through sleeping/waking 
cycles, and during the waking portions, their eyes will open, their bodies 
will move, and sounds will issue from their mouths; none of those actions is 
any apparent response to any stimuli.83 Another group is classed as those in 
a “minimally conscious state.”84 These people usually appear to be 
vegetative, but occasionally—a few times a day, once every few weeks—
have short periods of responsiveness.85 People in a vegetative or minimally 
conscious state may be in those states permanently, may improve, or may 
decline.86  
Two researchers, Adrian Owen, originally of Cambridge University 
and now at the University of West Ontario, and Steven Laureys at the 
University of Liège, have been exploring these states for over a decade.87 A 
few years ago, they used 54 consecutive people who came into their 
hospitals in either a vegetative state or a minimally conscious state as 
research subjects.88 They put these people in MRI scanners and talked to 
them.89 They told each of these people two different things: either to think 
about playing tennis (“motor imagery”), or to think about walking through 
their homes or around their neighborhoods (“spatial imagery”).90  
 
 79. See id. at 32 (“Coma is a state of non-responsiveness in which the patients lie with closed 
eyes cannot be awakened even when intensively stimulated.”). 
 80. See id. at 32–33 (explaining that people in comas have neither verbal production nor 
response to command, but can present reflexive responses to pain, and that prolonged comas 
progress to brain death, a vegetative state, or sometimes a locked-in syndrome). 
 81. Id. at 33; see infra note 82 (describing the awareness level of a vegetative patient). 
 82. See Gosseries et al., supra note 78, at 33 (explaining that the vegetative patient is awake 
but not aware). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 34; see also infra note 85 (describing the capacity for communication of the 
minimally conscious patient). 
 85. See Gosseries et al., supra note 78, at 34 (stating that patients in a vegetative state cannot 
functionally communicate, but can sometimes respond to verbal commands and make 
understandable verbalizations). 
 86. Martin M. Monti et al., Willful Modulation of Brain Activity Disorders of Consciousness, 
362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 579, 580 (2010). 
 87. Id. at 579; see generally Steven Laureys et al., Brain Function in Coma, Vegetative State, 
and Related Disorders, 3 LANCET NEUROLOGY 537 (2004) (demonstrating the author’s affiliation 
and credentials). 
 88. Monti et al., supra note 86. 
 89. See id. at 581 (describing what the researchers discussed with the patients). 
 90. Id. 
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While these conversations were going on with totally unresponsive 
subjects, the MRI was doing an fMRI scan, detecting relative ratios of 
oxygenated and de-oxygenated hemoglobin to determine what areas of the 
brain were active when the subjects were told these scenarios.91 
Specifically, for the tennis question, the researchers looked for activation in 
the secondary motor area, which is usually activated when people are 
thinking about making motions.92 For the walking around question, the 
researchers were looking for activation in the parahippocampal gyrus, an 
area that is often activated when people are navigating.93 For 49 of the 54 
people, the researchers found no signal in either location.94 For five people, 
the researchers got activation in the secondary motor area when they were 
talking about tennis; for four of those five people, and no one else, when 
they were asked the navigation question, the researchers saw activation in 
the parahippocampal gyrus.95 
These people had not been responding outwardly, by any sign, to 
anything, but their brains responded to being talked to. That, in itself, does 
not mean they were conscious, as a sleeping person’s brain might 
distinguish between hearing a siren in the distance and hearing a baby cry. 
Owen and Laureys took the experiment a step further.96 One of their 
subjects had been diagnosed as in a persistent vegetative state for over five 
years.97 He was one of the four people whose brain responded to both 
questions, so they put him back in the MRI scanner and asked him yes and 
no questions, such as “Was your father’s name Alexander?” and “Do you 
have any brothers?”98 The patient, although completely outwardly 
unresponsive, “was instructed to respond by thinking of one type of 
imagery (either motor imagery or spatial imagery) for an affirmative answer 
and the other type of imagery for a negative answer.”99 He was asked six 
 
 91. Id. at 579; see generally Jeroen C.W. Siero et al., Blood Oxygenation Level-
Dependent/Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging: Underpinnings, Practice, and Perspectives, 
8 PET CLINICS. 579, 579 (2013) (providing a comprehensive overview of blood oxygenation 
level-dependent brain activity). 
 92. See Monti, supra note 86, at 579, 581 (explaining that imagery tasks are associated with 
MRI activity in certain portions of the brain, and disclosing why the researchers chose these types 
of questions). 
 93. See id. at 584 (noting that activity in the parahippocampal gyrus during the activation 
period was compared to the parahippocampal gyrus activity during the rest period). 
 94. Id. at 585, 588. 
 95. Id. at 583. 
 96. See id. at 585 (explaining that the researchers conducted additional tests on some 
participants). 
 97. Id. at 581. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
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questions, and based on the activation patterns in his fMRI scan, got the 
first five right.100 For whatever reason—sleep, boredom, ambiguity, 
confusion, something else—he made no discernible response to the last 
question.101  
Since that 2010 publication, this field has been very active and the 
story has become complicated, but no one seems to doubt that at least some 
people in vegetative states can use this method to respond correctly to some 
questions—that is, mindreading for communication.102 You could imagine 
using that method for answers to be used in court, in a hospital, or in a 
nursing facility in order to ask people whether they are in pain, what 
treatment they want, or anything else. The legal and non-legal implications 
are profound.  
 
B.      Lie Detection Broadly 
 
The biggest use of neuroscience-based mindreading in law will be de 
facto lie detection. This is not necessarily lie detection, where the mind is 
probed to see if it has a deceptive purpose, but looking for evidence of 
mental states that are at variance with the person’s description of his or her 
mental state. Thus, when someone who answers the question “are you in 
pain?” with “yes, I am,” testing for whether that person’s physical brain 
state is or is not strongly correlated with the subjective mental state of pain 
is, in effect, lie detection. 
This form of lie-detection is neither new nor unusual. Police officers 
could stop a driver whose car is weaving and ask, “Are you intoxicated?” 
When the driver slurs “off courshe I’m nawt, orfisher,” the policeman could 
take the driver’s word for it, or the policeman could test his blood alcohol 
using a Breathalyzer. In that case, the Breathalyzer functions, at least in 
part, as a lie detector.103 It provides evidence of a mental state in addition to 
the person’s self-report.104 “Doping” tests in sports are another example. So 
 
 100. Id. at 584–85. 
 101. Id. at 585. 
 102. See, e.g., Dalia B. Taylor, Note, Communication with Vegetative State Patients: The Role 
of Neuroimaging in American Disability Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1451, 1451 (2014) (providing an 
article showing that the field is expanding). 
 103. Looked at rigorously, a breathalyzer is both less and more than a lie detector. The drunk 
driver might honestly believe he is sober, so detecting a high blood alcohol might provide 
evidence of intoxication without necessarily showing that the driver lied. At the same time, the 
breathalyzer’s blood alcohol percentage is correlated only imperfectly with the subjective mental 
state: two people could have the same blood alcohol percentage with very different subjective 
mental states.  
 104. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.  
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are law school exams—a professor could just ask her students, “do you 
understand the course really well? Well? Not so well? Terribly?” The 
professor could give them grades based on their answers to that question. In 
many areas, however, we are not comfortable relying on self-report and, 
when we can, we want more evidence than just someone’s statement.  
Neuroscience-based mindreading may be able provide additional 
evidence to double check a person’s reported mental state wherever mental 
state is important to the law. Neuroscience-based pain detection is one clear 
example. It could be useful for people—infants or the unconscious—or 
even, perhaps, non-people (non-human animals or maybe human fetuses) 
who cannot communicate. But it is likely to be more useful in testing 
whether somebody who claims to be in pain is showing the brain activation 
patterns that do or do not correlate with the existence of either acute or 
chronic pain. 
Pain is not the only such legally important mental state. My Stanford 
colleague Anthony Wagner studies the neuroscience of memory.105 He did 
an experiment where he showed the research subjects (who were largely 
undergraduate psychology majors, probably second only to rodents as 
subjects of fMRI experiments) photographs of 476 faces, giving them a few 
minutes to look at them, and telling them to try to remember the faces.106 
He then put the subjects in an MRI and showed them 150 faces, half that 
were among the faces they had seen before and half that were not.107 He 
told them to push one of two buttons to signal whether they had or had not 
seen the faces before.108 When he analyzed the fMRI results, he was able to 
predict which button they were going to push; in other words, he was able 
to determine whether they thought they recognized the face or not.109 He 
was much less able to predict whether they had actually seen the face, 
though he was still statistically significantly better than chance.110  
Is that important? Well, think about a test where you show a defendant 
in an MRI pictures of unpublicized pictures of a crime scene and then 
 
 105. See generally Kolber, supra note 15, at 439 (describing how neuroimaging may 
supplement our evaluations of pain); Jesse Rissman et al., Detecting Individual Memories 
Through the Neural Decoding of Memory States and Past Experience, 107 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. 
SCI. U.S.A. 9849, 9849–50 (2010) (describing a study in which participants were exposed to 
grayscale photographs of faces). 
 106. Rissman et al., supra note 105, at 671–72.  
 107. Id. at 673 (describing the data acquisition process in which the functional imaging was 
performed on a 3-T Signa MRI system and subjects were then exposed to the images).  
 108. Id. (noting that all participants responded using a keypad). 
 109. See generally id. at 678 (explaining the novelty detection and prediction error).  
 110. See id. at 678–79 (explaining how there was enhanced activation versus face stimuli 
during the probe period).  
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examine the results to determine whether his brain, right or wrongly, 
recognized them or not. That should certainly not be used as conclusive 
evidence of guilt or innocence, but it might be some evidence at trial and, 
perhaps more importantly, before trial in making decisions about whom to 
investigate.  
A similar technique uses EEG, electro-encephalography, which has 
many advantages over fMRI—it is cheap, portable, and easy to operate.111 
This method looks for something called the P300 signal, which is a 
response that occurs about 300 milliseconds after some stimuli.112 
Researchers are not sure whether it comes after stimuli that subjects 
remember or recognize, or if the response merely seems salient—if it occurs 
only after they see something that draws their attention.113 This use of the 
P300 signal has had, in some scientific circles, a bad name.114 The first 
researcher to push this enthusiastically was Dr. Larry Farwell, who formed 
a company called “Brain Fingerprinting” to use P300 for lie detection, and 
then promoted it in ways that most people in the field thought were 
exaggerated, putting the whole approach under a cloud.115 Another 
researcher, Professor Peter Rosenfeld at Northwestern, has also worked 
very hard on this approach along with many other researchers around the 
world.116  
Rosenfeld, again using undergraduate subjects, showed each subject 
three photographs related to a terrorism scenario.117 He showed them an 
iconic picture of a city (the Golden Gate Bridge for San Francisco, for 
example), a location (a sports arena, an office building, or a school), and a 
 
 111. See Fabio Massimo Zanzotto & Danilo Croce, Comparing EEG/ERP-Like and fMRI-Like 
Techniques for Reading Machine Thoughts, 6334 BRAIN INFORMATICS 133, 134 (2010) 
(explaining how ERP/EEG is a relatively cheaper technique that provides more course-grained 
data as opposed to fMRI models). 
 112. See Vahid Abootalebi et al., A comparison of Methods for ERP Assessment in a P300-
Based GKT, 62 INT’L J. PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 309, 310 (2006) (explaining how the peak is 
between 300–1000 ms from the stimulus onset). 
 113. Id. (noting that the efficacy of P300-based lie detectors is still controversial). 
 114. See generally J. Peter Rosenfeld, Brain Fingerprinting: A Critical Analysis, 4 SCI. REV. 
MENTAL HEALTH PRAC. 20, 21 (2005) (explaining how even though there has been considerable 
positive publicity, there has also been negative criticism, and that the P300 has not been 
necessarily a successful lie detector). 
 115. Id.at 20. 
 116. See id. (acknowledging that Rosenfeld is one of many investigators who have used brain 
waves and related technology in the detection of deception). 
 117. See John B. Meixner & J. Peter Rosenfeld, A Mock Terrorism Application of the P300-
Based Concealed Information Test, 48 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 149, 150 (2010) (explaining the 
participants selected and the use of three different categories of information used in the study).  
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potential weapon (a bomb, a propane tank, or an automatic rifle).118 Each 
subject saw one photo from each category, recreating in a sense, the board 
game Clue: a propane tank, in San Francisco, in a football stadium.119 He 
then showed them all the pictures in random order while they were being 
monitored by the EEG, and looked for their P300 reactions.120 He reported 
that with over 90 percent accuracy, he could tell from their reactions which 
photos that the particular subject had seen earlier.121 This is not “lie 
detection” since the subjects had not lied or even said anything. But if the 
subjects had been asked about a terrorist plot, this would be one way of 
providing some evidence about the accuracy of what they answered.  
 
 
C.      Lie Detection Narrowly 
 
In addition to these indirect methods of de facto lie detection, there is 
frank lie detection, where people claim to be looking for signals of 
deception itself.122 This has received a great deal attention (including from 
me), mainly because two companies started selling this lie detection service 
in the United States in 2007.123 Only one company is still in the market (the 
improbably named No Lie MRI), while its competitor (the more restrained 
“Cephos”) has dropped this service.124  
Over 30 peer-reviewed studies have now found statistically significant 
correlations between patterns of brain activation and when somebody is 
 
 118. Id. (explaining the procedure in which subjects were presented with a location, date, and 
method of a planned attack). 
 119. Id. (describing the random order of each category). 
 120. Id. at 151 (describing the data acquisition process and how the bootstrap method was 
applied in order to evaluate P300 reactions). 
 121. Id. at 152 (positively identifying 12 out of 12 “hypothetical” terrorism suspects through 
the use of P300 mindreading). 
 122. See generally Greely & Illes, supra note 19, at 377 (summarizing twelve research studies 
which measured brain signals to identify deception signals in the brain); Elena Rusconi & 
Timothy Mitchener-Nissen, Prospects of Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging as Lie 
Detector, 7 FRONTIERS HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE 1 (2013) (analyzing scientific and legal 
challenges to the use of fMRI scans as lie detectors, and concluding that due to ethical, 
operational, and social hurdles, current fMRI procedures are unlikely to constitute a viable lie 
detector for criminal courts). 
 123. See Rusconi & Mitchener-Nissen, supra note 122, at 4 (noting that No Lie MRI and 
Cephos Corporation were founded in 2006 to bring lie detection tests to the court room). 
 124. See id. (describing private companies who conduct fMRI lie detection); see also Greg 
Miller, Neuroscience is Getting Its Day in Court, Whether It’s Ready or Not, WIRED (Dec. 16, 
2013, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2013/12/brain-science-law/ (confirming that Cephos no 
longer provides fMRI lie-detection services). 
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lying.125 The biggest concern with these findings though (apart from the 
fact that the studies did not all find the same patterns of activation) is their 
lack of “ecological realism.”126 The experiments were usually done with 
undergraduates, and were always done with people who knew they were in 
an experiment and were following orders to “lie.”127 But how relevant are 
their reactions to a situation where someone under arrest says “no, I didn’t 
try to buy cocaine from that officer”? This kind of method to detect a brain 
signal of deceptive intent might turn out to work at some point, but much 
more work needs to be done before it can reliably be used.  
Judicial tests exist to determine whether scientific evidence like this 
can be admitted in court, but there are many places within the legal system 
(in criminal investigation and in sentencing, for example) where those 
constraints do not apply.128 And there are almost no constraints on selling 
these kinds of mind-reading services outside the legal system.129  
 
III.      HOW TO JUDGE NEUROSCIENCE-BASED MINDREADING 
 
If our society wants to use neuroscience-based mindreading, it is easy 
enough to do it poorly. The better question is, how can we do it well? What 
kind of proof should we demand before we accept such procedures as 
providing reliable and useful evidence either inside or outside the 
courtroom? The answer boils down to two things: science and systems. We 
need to be confident that the science can provide powerful results, and we 
need to be confident in the systems we use to produce those results. This 
 
 125. See Uri Hasson & Christopher J. Honey, Future Trends in Neuroimaging: Neural 
Processes as Expressed Within Real-life Contexts, 62 NEUROIMAGE 1272, 1273 (2012) (noting 
the growth of fMRI papers since 1994); see also, e.g., G. Ganis et al., Neural Correlates of 
Different Types of Deception: An fMRI Investigation, 13 CEREBRAL CORTEX 830–36 (2003) 
(finding that lies elicited more brain activation than telling the truth). 
 126. See infra note 127 and accompanying text; see also Greely & Illes, supra note 19, at 403–
04 (detailing that one of the main criticisms of the research is that study participants are not being 
observed in real-world circumstances, and that they lie about something unimportant or “under 
command”). 
 127. Greely & Illes, supra note 19, at 403–04 (noting another criticism of the research is that 
they “used healthy young adults, almost all right handed, with little gender or ethnic diversity”); 
see, e.g., Meixner & Rosenfeld, supra note 117, at 152 (participants were undergraduate students 
at Northwestern University). 
 128. See generally Pamela J. Jensen, Note, Frye Versus Daubert: Practically the Same?, 87 
MINN. L. REV. 1579–1620 (2003) (analyzing the two general standards, Frye and Daubert, for 
determining the admissibility of novel scientific expert testimony). 
 129. See generally Amy E. White, The Lie of fMRI: An Examination of the Ethics of a Market 
in Lie Detection Using Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 22 HEALTHCARE ETHICS 
COMMITTEE FORUM 253, 259–61 (2010) (analogizing the use of fMRI to that of a polygraph test 
in analyzing the ethical and legal considerations when using fMRI testing). 
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section will explore both of those points, and will then suggest, as an 
example, how we might seek to make neuroscience-based pain detection 
reliable enough for widespread use. 
 
A.      Science 
 
Neuroscience-based mindreading depends on correlating subjective 
mental states with physical brain states using fMRI, with activation patterns 
inferred from ratios of oxygenated to de-oxygenated hemoglobin.130 We 
will need good science to know just how strong those correlations are. 
Science would benefit from five things that are generally missing today: big 
samples, diverse samples, ecologically realistic experiments, studies of 
countermeasures, and, of at least some value, underlying theories to help 
explain (and test) the correlations.  
Most fMRI experiments today are done with only a few subjects, 
whether that be four, ten, twenty, or thirty. Although the published studies 
claim statistical significance in spite of the low numbers, we would be more 
confident if we had studies done on hundreds or thousands of people. The 
problem is that fMRI studies are expensive—one hour-long scan of one 
subject, when overhead and analysis costs are included, will often cost a 
researcher more than $1,000.131 Genetics projects can get multi-million 
dollar grants; fMRI research has to make do with much smaller budgets and 
hence, much smaller numbers.132  
But just having more subjects is not enough. Testing 10,000 white, 
right-handed undergraduate males at elite schools, all of whom denied ever 
taking illegal drugs, would not necessarily tell us about people who did not 
meet those criteria. For confidence, good-sized studies need to be done on 
young people and old people, men and women, people who have taken 
drugs and those who haven’t, people who are currently taking drugs and 
people who aren’t, people who have had mental illnesses of various sorts 
 
 130. See Rusconi & Mitchener-Nissen, supra note 122, at 2. 
 131. See Yale School of Medicine, Usage Charges, MAGNETIC RESONANCE RES. CENTER, 
http://mrrc.yale.edu/users/charges.aspx (last visited Mar. 2, 2015) (quoting a $720 cost per fMRI 
slot plus a $250 per study for analysis support). 
 132. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Services, Estimates of Funding for Various 
Research, Condition, and Disease Categories (RCDC), NIH RES. PORTFOLIO ONLINE REPORTING 
TOOLS (Feb. 5, 2015), http://report.nih.gov/categorical_spending.aspx (providing a list of every 
grant awarded by the NIH in the past three years, detailing that research dollars granted to all 
“Neurosciences”—including fMRI research—totaled about $5.7 billion compared with $7.5 
billion granted to “Genetics” research). 
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and people who haven’t.133 Fundamentally, one would like to have good 
studies of a wide variety of people who are, in most (if not all) plausibly 
relevant ways, like the real life subject who would be questioned using 
mindreading.  
At the same time, the experiments need to be realistic. In some cases, 
that may not be hard. For people who claim to have incapacitating back 
pain while lying down, having them lie down in scanners will be fairly 
similar to their real world experience—that is, assuming they are not so 
distracted or frightened by the scanner as to produce different results. Other 
cases may be more difficult, sometimes for physical or temporal reasons. 
People whose back pain comes when sitting may not be easily testable in 
the horizontal tubes of most MRI machines. People who claim occasionally 
to experience crippling headaches just may not have a headache when 
scanned.  
Sometimes, though, the problems will not be physical or logistical, but 
ethical. Lie detection experiments today are done on people who know they 
are in a research experiment, who have signed a consent form after being 
told about the experiment, who are following orders to lie, and who face no 
severe consequences if their lie is not believed.134 A much better test would 
be to have the police arrest some random undergraduates for, say, underage 
drinking offenses and scan them all when they are questioned about their 
drinking. A blood test or a Breathalyzer should be able to provide a “gold 
standard” for whether they had been drinking; those questioned could be 
divided into a two-by-two matrix of those who had been drinking and those 
who hadn’t, and those who had told the truth and those who didn’t.  
The only problem is that no institutional review board (“IRB”) will (or 
should) allow you to treat research subjects that way. Yet, without the spur 
of real anxiety leading to “real” lying, it may not be possible to know 
whether the mindreading techniques from controlled experiments would 
produce the same result with real criminals, or even with the dutiful son 
who, less than truthfully, says on Thanksgiving, “no, Mom, the turkey was 
perfect and it wasn’t too dry.” The results in a typical experiment might 
transfer to the real world, but they might not. Without some more realistic 
experiments, how can we be confident about their relevance?  
Countermeasures raise another important issue. Consider 
neuroimaging for pain detection. Many people who have had kidney stones 
 
 133. See generally Katherine S. Button et al., Power Failure: Why Small Sample Size 
Undermines the Reliability of Neuroscience, 14 NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 365, 365–66 
(2013) (analyzing how the incentive to publish causes scientists to limit the sample size, thus 
reducing the reliability of their studies). 
 134. See Greely & Illes, supra note 19, at 403–04. 
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will be happy to tell you how painful they were. If a plaintiff is in an MRI 
machine trying to pretend that he is feeling pain, what will the scanner 
show if he concentrates on remembering every excruciating detail of his 
kidney stone? We don’t know. We know that countermeasure can be 
successfully employed (by at least some people) against the polygraph, but 
most mindreading researchers (with a few honorable exceptions) have not 
begun to think about seeing if countermeasures work, or if there are 
countermeasures to the countermeasures.135 
For all of these points, it would help if neuroscience had provided 
strong predictive theories about what kinds of brain activation patterns one 
should expect for certain subjective mental states. A set of testable 
hypotheses, if consistently upheld in experiments, could give us more 
confidence that the correlations we are seeing are real. Right now, most of 
this work is purely empirical—subjects in scanners are exposed to stimuli 
that are expected to create a subjective mental state (pain, recognition, 
deception), and the researchers trawl through the universe of the fMRI data 
looking to see what seems to be associated with the stimulus.136 Compare 
that to forensic DNA, where we have excellent reasons (both theoretical and 
empirical) to believe that, apart from monozygotic (identical) twins, two 
people are extremely unlikely to have matching DNA profiles.137  
More studies, with more diverse populations, with greater realism and 
attention to possible countermeasures, as well as some testable predictive 
theories about what kinds of activation patterns should be expected, would 
produce much greater confidence in the results of neuroscience-based 
mindreading. But science alone is not enough.  
 
B.      Systems 
 
The second thing that is crucial to confidence in a scientific 
technology is a system. The tests should follow defined protocols, and 
should use accredited laboratories where the technicians follow the 
instructions in a manual to perform the test the same way every time.  
 
 135. See generally Giorgio Ganis et al,, Lying in the Scanner: Covert Countermeasures 
Disrupt Deception Detection by Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 55 NEUROIMAGE 312 
(2011) (examining the effects of countermeasures on the reliability of fMRI results). 
 136. See Rusconi & Mitchener-Nissen, supra note 122, at 2–3 (noting how the research 
aggregates data taken from brain scanners). 
 137. See generally Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, What DNA “Fingerprinting” Can 
Teach the Law About the Rest of Forensic Science, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 361 (1991) (analyzing 
how the rigor of DNA testing provides a model for the introduction of new forms of forensic 
evidence); see also Rana Saad, Discovery, Development, and Current Applications of DNA 
Identity Testing, 18 BUMC PROC. 130 (2005) (describing the reliability of DNA testing). 
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Only one U.S. appellate decision has ruled on neuroscience-based lie 
detection: United States v. Semrau.138 The district court magistrate judge 
(now an Article III district judge) wrote an excellent opinion, which the 
Sixth Circuit affirmed and largely adopted.139 The Sixth Circuit took 
concern with the fact that the fMRI lie detection service (which the criminal 
defendant had used) made up their procedures as they went along.140 The 
experiments on which they based their method had, unusually, been done 
on people aged 18 to 50, but the defendant was 63 years old.141 They tested 
the defendant twice on the same day.142 In the morning session, the result 
said he was telling the truth, but the afternoon session showed he was 
lying.143 The firm then decided that he had probably been tired in the 
afternoon, so they repeated the test on a later day, getting another favorable 
result, which led the expert to testify that “a finding such as this is 100% 
accurate in determining truthfulness from a truthful person.”144  
Given that this particular person had “passed” the test only two times 
out of three, that “100%” seemed questionable, and that kind of ad hoc 
cherry picking of results does not promote confidence.145 As the district 
court said:  
 
Because the use of fMRI-based lie detection is still in its 
early stages of development, standards controlling the real-
life application have not yet been established. Without such 
standards, a court cannot adequately evaluate the reliability 
of a particular lie detection examination. Assuming, 
arguendo, that the standards testified to by Dr. Laken could 
 
 138. 693 F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 139. United States v. Semrau, No. 07-10074, 2010 U.S. Dist. WL 6845092, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. 
June 1, 2010), aff'd, 693 F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 2012).  
 140. 693 F.3d at 522 (noting that there are no concrete standards from real world testing, and 
that the tests that were performed on Dr. Semrau in the laboratory were different from those used 
in other studies, suggesting that the firm was still trying to understand the basics of fMRI lie 
detection results). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 518–19. 
 143. Id. at 519. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 519–20 (explaining that some doubt the results because there is a difference in what 
a person believes and conveys during the test, and what the person was thinking during the actual 
event). 
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satisfy Daubert, it appears that Dr. Laken violated his own 
protocols when he re-scanned Dr. Semrau. . . .146  
 
An excellent precedent exists for providing (and following) standards 
for forensic tests: forensic use of DNA.147 The forensic use of DNA is not 
perfect—mistakes can be made, or test results can be corrupted 
intentionally.148 But, overall, it has been remarkably successful.149 
In the early 1990s, though, when prosecutors first tried to introduce 
DNA evidence in U.S. courts, it was very controversial.150 One problem 
was with the science.151 Experts disagreed about the likely effects of 
patterns of genetic variations within populations that might throw off the 
results.152 Some argued that results based on the frequencies of different 
markers in, say, European-Americans might not apply to African-
Americans or Native Americans.153 These arguments resulted in a report by 
the National Academy of Sciences that concluded the concern was 
appropriate.154 The report argued that further research needed to be done, 
but until it was, the courts should only allow the use of very conservative 
estimates of the odds against an accidental match.155 Several years later, 
after that further research had been, the National Academy did a second 
 
 146. United States v. Semrau, No. 07-10074, 2010 U.S. Dist. WL 6845092, at *13 (W.D. 
Tenn. June 1, 2010), aff'd, 693 F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Cordoba, 194 F.3d 
1053, 1061 (9th Cir. Cal. 1999)). 
 147. Henry T. Greely et al., Family Ties: The Use of DNA Offender Databases to Catch 
Offenders' Kin, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 248, 250 (2006) (noting that there is a uniform standard of 
DNA markers). 
 148. See NAT'L ACAD. OF SCIENCES, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED 
STATES: A PATH FORWARD 130 (1992) [hereinafter Strengthening Forensic Science] (noting that 
there is a possibility of false positives or fraudulent dealings with the results). 
 149. Id. at 184 (referring to the success that the judiciary system has had in the use of forensic 
DNA). 
 150. See id. at 40 (noting that there were concerns that there needed to be more blind trials 
prior to its use). 
 151. See id. at 40–41 (stating that the use of DNA evidence in the courts for forensic purposes 
was concerning due to the possibility of contamination and degradation of the evidence along with 
statistical analysis faultiness). 
 152. See Greely et al., supra note 147, at 251 (noting that certain genetic structures may cause 
random matches to be a greater possibility); see also NAT'L ACAD. OF SCIENCES, DNA 
TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC EVIDENCE 79–80 (1992) [hereinafter DNA Technology] (noting that 
population substructures could have an impact on genotype frequency calculations). 
 153. See DNA Technology, supra note 152, at 79 (stating that different allele frequencies are 
apparent in their respective racial groups). 
 154. NAT'L ACAD. OF SCIENCES, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE 187 (1996) 
[hereinafter Evaluation of DNA Evidence] (noting that the 1992 National Academy of Sciences 
report shows that there were differing views of population geneticists on this topic, which was 
"proof of a major scientific disagreement."). 
 155. Id. at 187 n.69, 204. 
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report and concluded the problem had been solved.156 That is an example of 
the raising and answering of scientific questions about the technique.  
At least as important for the use of forensic DNA was the 
standardization of testing protocols. In an early criminal case that involved 
the use of forensic DNA in the New York state courts, People v. Castro, 
after the day’s testimony, some of the expert witnesses for the opposing 
sides got together and talked about the case. (I have heard one participant 
say that their discussions took place at a bar after the day’s testimony.) Two 
of the prosecution experts agreed with the defense experts that the 
testimony should not be admitted because of the ways it did not live up to 
the standards under which such testing should be done.157 Eventually, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) started accrediting crime labs to do 
DNA work.158 The FBI produces and regularly updates a manual that not 
only describes how the testing should be done, but states how and how 
often the laboratory should be audited.159 Additional guidelines have been 
created by the National DNA Index System (CODIS) in its Standards for 
the Acceptance of DNA Data, and by the American Society of Crime 
Laboratory Directors Laboratory Accreditation Board.160 The FBI and 
CODIS guidelines apply to forensic DNA analyses that the federal 
government conducts; the CODIS guidelines apply to testing done by the 
 
 156. See EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES, 
EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH 
INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL 6 (1996) (“The state of the profiling technology and the methods for 
estimating frequencies and related statistics have progressed to the point where the admissibility 
of properly collected and analyzed DNA data should not be in doubt.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (citation omitted)). 
 157. See William C. Thompson, Evaluating the Admissibility of New Genetic Identification 
Tests: Lessons from the DNA War, 84 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 22, 43 (1993); see also People 
v. Castro 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 986 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989) (noting that this constituted a landmark 
case for the admissibility of DNA evidence in criminal cases). 
 158. NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41800, DNA TESTING IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 
BACKGROUND, CURRENT LAW, GRANTS, AND ISSUES 2 (2012). 
 159. QUALITY ASSURANCE STANDARDS FOR FORENSIC DNA TESTING LABORATORIES (2009), 
available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/biometric-analysis/codis/qas_testlab.pdf; see also 
Scientific Working Group on DNA Analysis Methods (SWGDAM), SWGDAM, 
http://www.swgdam.org/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2015) (noting that the Scientific Working Group on 
DNA Analysis Methods (“SWGDAM”) works with the FBI to create guidelines and standards for 
DNA testing, analysis, and forensic work). 
 160. See Mark Nelson, Making Sense of DNA Backlogs—Myths vs. Reality, 266 NAT’L INST. 
JUST. J. 20, 23 (2010) (noting that CODIS was created as a DNA database, which is accessible to 
various federal and state agencies in their efforts to solve crime); see also FBI LAB., NAT'L DNA 
INDEX SYSTEM (NDIS) OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES MANUAL 5–6 (2013) (explaining the 
standards of acceptance of DNA data); see also Objectives, AM. SOC'Y CRIME LABORATORY 
DIRECTORS, http://www.ascld-lab.org/objectives/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2015) (noting that one of 
the objectives of the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors Laboratory Accreditation 
Board is to establish testing standards and guidelines to improve forensic analysis). 
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states, but that is sent to the national CODIS registry.161 For forensic DNA 
analysis that is only for state use, the states set their own standards, which 
usually adopt the FBI standards, the Accreditation Board’s standards, or 
both.162 These required procedures are, of course, to some extent 
bureaucratic and mindless, and they cannot prevent the occasional bad 
mistake or corrupt worker. They do, however, make the process more 
reliable and give judges and jurors (and the prosecution and defense 
counsel) more confidence in its result.  
 
C.      What Might Be Done and How: Pain Detection as an Example 
 
Neuroscience-based pain detection could be tested to see how reliable 
it is by first starting with experiments that have lots of subjects with diverse 
characteristics, and by making the experimental conditions as similar as 
possible to the conditions experienced by people with legal claims 
stemming from pain. If some of the methods seem effective, test them for 
countermeasures and, if countermeasures seem effective, look for ways to 
detect or block them. And, while all of that testing is going on, researchers 
can do supportive research (and thinking) on testable theories for how the 
subjective feeling of pain should look in fMRI scans and why.  
This is a process that is far beyond the possibilities of one researcher 
with an NIH grant. Ultimately, it could require tens of thousands of subjects 
and hundreds of millions of dollars. But one could ease into it. A researcher 
could start with one or more of the most common kinds of pain that arise in 
legal proceedings, at least as long as it seemed tractable to neuroscience-
based detection. For example, a researcher could start by studying chronic 
and allegedly disabling lower back pain among people over, say, 50. It is a 
very common condition with an affected population that, although large, 
might be fairly carefully defined.163  
 
 161. See Nelson, supra note 160 (noting that both the federal and state level enforcement 
authorities have access to CODIS for DNA analysis information). 
 162. See History of DNA Databases, GOVERNOR’S OFF. CRIME CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
http://www.goccp.maryland.gov/dna/database.php (last visited Mar. 5, 2015) (noting that every 
state in the nation has a statutory provision for the establishment of a DNA database); see, e.g., 44 
PA. CONS. STAT. § 23 (2004) (providing for DNA detection of sexual and other offenders); see 
also Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) on the CODIS Program and the National DNA Index 
System, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/biometric-analysis/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet 
(last visited Mar. 5, 2015) (noting that the CODIS and NDIS system are used both by both federal 
and state agencies in DNA analysis work). 
 163. See Low Back Pain in Older Adults, SPINE-HEALTH, http://www.spine-
health.com/conditions/lower-back-pain/low-back-pain-older-adults (last visited Mar. 5, 2015) 
(explaining that individuals over the age of 60 frequently suffer from back pain). Note that there 
will still be a problem of having a “gold standard” baseline determination of whether a subject 
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Scans of one thousand subjects of different ages, sexes, ethnic 
backgrounds, drug use, and mental illness histories might be able to provide 
some solid statistical evidence (with confidence intervals) for how often the 
test produces false positives (in effect, its specificity) or false negatives (its 
sensitivity). From that, one could calculate its positive predictive value 
(what percentage of the time a positive test result will mean that someone is 
actually in pain), and its negative predictive value (what percentage of the 
time a negative test result will mean that someone is actually not in pain). 
These could be further refined depending on the strength or weakness of 
more traditional evidence about pain in particular cases. For example, in 
cases where the traditional measures strongly indicated that pain was 
present, the accuracy might be 98 percent; for weaker traditional evidence, 
the accuracy might fall to 80 percent. Then, for test methods where the 
results were promising, one hundred or two hundred subjects could be used 
to test potential countermeasures. 
The experimental conditions that produced the best results could then 
be “routinized” for use in commercial laboratories or clinics. Expert groups 
could propose procedures, manuals, and accreditation procedures, and the 
accuracy rates of this pain detection in the “real world” could be tested 
using those approved methods.  
At that point, if the results were favorable, we would have a pain 
detection test for a very common source of pain-related litigation for which 
we knew the accuracy, the confidence intervals, and the efficacy of 
countermeasures when these tests are performed according to standardized 
procedures. That does not mean the method would be adopted universally, 
if adopted at all. One issue lingers though: how good is good enough? Is a 
98 percent positive predictive value (where only two percent of the subjects 
with positive tests actually do not feel pain) good enough? What about a 90 
percent negative predictive value (where ten percent of those who test 
negative actually have pain)? Is the standard considered to be “good 
enough” for research purposes still “good enough” in a jury trial involving 
an automobile accident or in a social security disability proceeding before 
an administrative law judge? How would juries or judges be expected to 
weigh the neuroscience evidence against other, more traditional evidence 
about pain? But at the very least, we would have a test whose accuracy was 
well understood, and a test that people have reasons based on good 
evidence to accept or to reject. 
 
“really” is or is not in pain. Clinicians may be able to identify clear cases in one direction or 
another, though that might still leave an intermediate group for whom the experimental results 
would not be as clear.  
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This would not be cheap though. My back-of-the-envelope estimate is 
that $15 to $20 million over three years might be enough to get a good 
handle on one or more tests for common chronic lower back pain. That is 
probably about 0.05 percent or less of the NIH budget, but the NIH does not 
include a “National Institute of Pain.”164 And this amount is a much higher 
percentage of the budget of the National Institute of Justice, which spends 
very little of its (very little) money on neuroscience research.165 
But there should be ways to raise money for this kind of program of 
test development. Legal disputes over pain are common and costly.166 We 
know that, even with present expert testimony, sometimes the results are 
wrong.167 People who should win, lose; and people who should lose, win. 
Having a better test improves those results, which is a good thing, whether 
it leads to more money being paid out (but with more accuracy) or less 
money being paid out (also with more accuracy). There is another 
advantage: having a better test should prevent more pain cases from going 
to trial or going to hearings. The stronger the test, the more often lawyers or 
parties will settle, thus saving valuable resources that otherwise could all 
too easily be wasted in lengthy and expensive litigation. 
The potential may be there, but who would do it? Insurers, state 
disability programs, or the Social Security Administration might finance 
such a research program; but if the research were only funded and 
supervised by potential defendants, plaintiffs, claimants, and the lawyers 
who represent them are likely to call foul. One would want to come up with 
a source (or sources) of funding that is perceived as neutral, or at least a 
source that is balanced in its biases toward each side. Finding such a source 
is a challenge. Unless we take that challenge and move toward a rational, 
well-funded program that seeks to create good neuroscience tests to detect 
pain, progress will be slowed—not so much by the lack of science, but by 
the lack of a plan and a program to get the science in a condition where it 
can be useful in resolving disputes.  
 
 
 164. See Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 113-235 (2015) 
(detailing the NIH budget for 2015); David Malakoff & Jeffrey Mervis, First Look: New U.S. 
Spending Deal a Mixed Bag for Science, SCIENCE INSIDER (Dec. 9, 2014, 10:30 PM), 
http://news.sciencemag.org/funding/2014/12/first-look-new-u-s-spending-deal-mixed-bag-science 
(explaining that the NIH is receiving roughly $30 billion for the fiscal year of 2015).  
 165. See Pub. L. No. 113-235 (describing the 2015 NIH budget).  
 166. Marc A. Franklin et al., Accidents, Money, and the Law: A Study of the Economics of 
Personal Injury Litigation, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1961) (explaining that many people have 
experienced personal injury litigation, which is expensive). 
 167. See Douglas R. Richmond, The Emerging Theory of Expert Witness Malpractice, 22 CAP. 
U. L. REV. 693, 693–94 (1993) (noting that while courts have increasingly utilized expert witness 
testimony, expert witnesses have not always been accurate in their testimony). 
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IV.      THE DEEPEST IMPLICATION 
 
Let us say that, hypothetically, neuroscience-based mindreading 
works. Let us dream that someone neutral provides $20,000,000 over four 
years, and that the investment yields a test that detects the presence or 
absence of potentially disabling chronic lower back pain with positive and 
negative predictive values of about 90 percent, plus or minus three percent. 
If we are willing to accept 90 percent accuracy, especially when other 
sources of evidence may also be considered, are there still potential 
problems? Unfortunately, yes. Like all changes to the legal system, it will 
bring new issues in its wake, but one seems particularly profound. It is 
perhaps the deepest issue raised by mindreading. 
Professor Nita Farahany has both written and is writing about an issue 
that she calls “cognitive liberty”—others think about it under the term 
“mental privacy”.168 Is scanning your brain different from a blood alcohol 
test? Is it different from watching how you walk or from listening to what 
you say? Is it invading something secret—or sacred?  
I hate to use this example of my mother’s Thanksgiving turkey, 
because my mother’s Thanksgiving turkey is never too dry. But if by some 
odd chance one Thanksgiving, the turkey were too dry, and she were to ask 
me, as she always does, “the turkey’s too dry this year, isn’t it,” then in the 
highly counterfactual case that it actually was too dry, I would, without 
hesitation or reservation, lie. If for some reason I could not lie, my ability at 
least to keep silent or otherwise sidestep the question would be very 
important.  
In a more serious hypothetical, what if, for example, you are a citizen 
of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Assume the government 
puts you in a scanner and shows you pictures of Kim Jong Un (president of 
North Korea), then pictures of Park Geun-hye (president of South Korea), 
and then pictures of President Obama. If the government wanted to be able 
to “read” your brain’s emotional reactions to each photograph, you might 
well want to be able keep your true feelings hidden.  
Today we have that ability to hide, at least in practice. Although (at 
least when the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination does 
 
 168. See generally Nita A. Farahany, Incriminating Thoughts, 64 STAN. L. REV. 351 (2012) 
(noting that individuals called to testify struggle with balancing the legal compulsion to testify 
with their own memories and personal thoughts, arguing that society should adopt more robust 
protections to safeguard cognitive liberties); see also Wrye Sententia, Neuroethical 
Considerations: Cognitive Liberty and Converging Technologies for Improving Human 
Cognition, 1013 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCIENCES 221, 222–23 (defining cognitive liberty as 
“freedom of thought”).  
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not apply) the law can “force you” to testify, and “force you” to tell the 
truth, it cannot really force you.169 It can jail you for contempt if you 
refuse, and in some jurisdictions, it could torture you (or send you to allies 
who will do the torture somewhere else).170 That may or may not get you to 
tell the truth—or merely get you to say whatever the torturers want to hear. 
Whatever the law, we have a special preserve that cannot reliably be 
invaded. If it could be invaded, should we allow it to? Should we say 
“never”? Or should we say, “it depends”?  
If the mindreading is involuntary, it is tempting to say “no,” but then 
one can construct “24 hour” terrorism scenarios that push the other 
direction, perhaps toward allowing some involuntary mindreading but only 
with a warrant.  
There can also be “quasi-involuntary” circumstances. For example, say 
someone wants to bring a lawsuit alleging damages from pain, but the 
defendant seeks an order for a pain detection brain scan. The plaintiff may 
have a fundamental objection to having her mind read, but refusing a court-
ordered medical test might lead to the dismissal of her suit. Is that 
mindreading “voluntary”?  
Of course, society could only allow the use of this kind of mindreading 
on people who freely and genuinely volunteer. That seems fine—except if 
you allow one person to do it voluntarily, what will that imply about those 
who choose not to do it? Prosecutors might easily use this refusal against 
people who refuse: “Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the defendant could 
have taken that lie detection test, but she chose not to. That is her right, but 
it is your right to draw whatever conclusions you want from her refusal.” 
Federal law does not allow such an argument to be made in criminal cases 
where the defendant invoked the privilege against self-incrimination, but 
would such a prohibition apply in these cases, especially in state civil cases 
or administrative hearings? And would the decision maker draw the 
negative inference without hearing it argued? Allowing anybody to use 
neuroscience-based mindreading voluntarily puts pressure on everybody 
else to do it, and thus makes their decisions less voluntary. 
Assuming we end up able to see through these scanners less darkly and 
more clearly, these are likely to be the deepest questions we will be forced 
to answer. If neuroscience-based mindreading becomes one of more useful 
 
 169. See Being a Witness, OHIO ST. B. ASS’N (April 10, 2014), https://www.ohiobar. 
org/ForPublic/Resources/LawFactsPamphlets/Pages/LawFactsPamphlet-20.aspx (explaining that 
while an individual may be compelled by the courts to testify, the individual does not physically 
have to testify). 
 170. See id. (explaining that if subpoenaed to be a witness in a trial, one must perform this duty 
or face contempt of court, which can result in jail time). 
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technologies, are there limits to when it should be used in order to protect 
cognitive liberty? If we do think there should be such a right, where do we 
find it—in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth 
Amendments to the Constitution? And maybe in the Second, Ninth, and 
Tenth Amendments of the Constitution? Is it in a constitutional penumbra? 
Would we need new legislation, or would we need a new constitutional 
amendment? I leave these questions for another day, but I am confident that 
if neuroscience-based mindreading becomes feasible, as I suspect it will for 
at least some applications, the day for those questions will come.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Not only do we live in interesting times, we also live in times that are 
becoming more and more interesting, and much of the interest comes from 
“secondary uses.” Neuroscientists are not (yet) receiving grants to create 
pain detectors for court purposes, or lie detectors for the criminal justice 
system.171 In the United States, neuroscientists are mainly funded by the 
National Institutes of Health because we want to relieve human suffering by 
learning more about how the brain works and how we can affect it.172 As 
we learn more about the brain, we will make valuable inroads against 
human suffering.  
But, as we learn more about the brain, what we learn will not 
necessarily be limited to understanding, preventing, or treating diseases. 
Just as biological research could lead to biological warfare, more 
knowledge about neuroscience and how human brains work can lead to 
other applications of that knowledge for things like mindreading and other 
practices that have plusses and minuses very different from those of the 
health applications of the technologies.  
We need, as a society, to pay enough attention, to become educated 
enough, and to think and worry enough about these secondary uses. Then, 
when they happen, we will have a decent chance to respond in an intelligent 
and useful way. I used to say that I do the work I do to try to maximize the 
benefits and minimize the harms of these new technologies. I have become 
 
 171. See generally Owen D. Jones & Francis X. Shen, Law and Neuroscience in the United 
States, in INTERNATIONAL NEUROLAW: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 349, 350 (Tade Matthias 
Spranger ed., 2012) (noting the recent developments of neuroscience in the law and how various 
organizations are looking into funding neuroscientists so that they may develop more information 
on how neuroscience can benefit the law). 
 172. See NIH Data Sharing Repositories, TRANS-NIH BIOMED. INFORMATICS COORDINATING 
COMMITTEE (BMIC), http://www.nlm.nih.gov/NIHbmic/nih_data_sharing_repositories.html (last 
updated Mar. 10, 2015) (displaying NIH-supported data suppositories, including neuroscience 
research funded by NIH grants).  
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somewhat more humble. My hope now is that, if we can get enough people 
educated and thinking about these issues in advance, we may be able to 
avoid a few catastrophes.  
So, I ask all of readers of this Article—please pay attention to the 
possible beneficial and less beneficial uses of neuroscience-based 
mindreading. If so, working together, we just might be able to avoid a few 
catastrophes.  
 
